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Abstract:
It is the nested-game theory that provides a new angle for the study on public participation mechanism in the decision-making of large 
public engineering projects. The public participation is not isolated, but nested in other games. This paper tries to analyze the main bodies' 
behavior on decision-making during the public participation from the main body of the game and utilityˈetc. Then it discusses about the 
effective approach of constructing multi-interests balanced mechanism under the new nested relationship of decision-making on large 
public engineering projects.
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Game theory is to study the decision-making when decision-making main bodies’ behavior have direct influence on 
each other, and also to study the balance of decision-making , which are all based on rational assumptions. In many games, 
the participants seem to act irrationally, but if treating the game as a part of a larger game you can see their behaviors are
rational. Such games are nested in a larger game. In this case, the optimal reaction of the big game might not be the best 
response to a small independent game, that is to say the small game may be used as a sub-game nested in the sequential game.
THE CURRENT SITUATION OF GOVERNMENT UNI-INTEREST MECHANISM IN THE DECISION-MAKING 
ON LARGE PUBLIC ENGINEERING PROJECTS
Major public construction project generally refers to the office buildings, tourism, construction, science, education 
building, communications, construction and transportation construction whose construction area is of 20000 ΃ or larger than 
it. The so-called "government monad domination decision-making mechanism " refers to following the model that contains 
decision-making, planning, preparation, management and implementation of major public construction project under the 
government’s overall lead and control. The government and the public showing asymmetric, non-equilibrium state, the 
government's absolute strength makes the public’s participation too weak. Under the influence of the long-planned economic 
system, China's major public engineering projects decision-making mechanism divides the work from top to bottom 
hierarchically and clearly. It has gradually formed the city planning construction administration system from nation to 
provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and counties. This paper simplifies the participants of major public 
engineering projects decision-making game to the central government, the local government and the public.
As the maker of game rules, the central government had a significant impact on game balance. Since it is a familiar 
system in major public engineering projects, Unitarianism differs from the market economy in both the supply and production 
relationship: On the supply, consumers are not a few independent individuals or collective, but may be all over a city, region 
or even the whole nation; on the production, it depends on specialized production institutions of internal organizations, such
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as various large economic and technological state-owned construction enterprises. In addition, the large-scale public 
engineering projects are usually heavily invested with a long construction period, and the central government allocates special 
funds for project construction which will greatly boost the local economy and employment rate. Therefore, there’s no doubt 
that local governments are greatly attracted who consider GDP as an important achievement indicator. Since the power and 
resource allocation between all levels of governments are top-down constrained, the career prospects of local officials have to 
rely on the central government, and the central government's recognition is the only path to their job promotion. 
Unitarianism’s incentives are accompanied with complex negative effects, which will influence the decision-making of major 
public engineering projects.
As the game participants in the decision-making game of major public engineering projects, the utility function of the 
central government, local governments and the public are not only directly bound by the of the game itself, but also by the 
temptation of grade power and the constraint of pressure. Therefore, they have opportunities for rent-seeking tendencies. 
Namely, to central and local governments, major public engineering projects in decision-making game are nested in the 
power system game. The role of central and local governments in major public engineering projects’ decision-making are 
politically affected rather than economically.
At the same time, because the public in major public engineering projects’ decision-making system belongs to a 
vulnerable group, they couldn’t have any substantial impact on the results. This is mainly based on the following reasons: 
Firstly, 
because of the contradictory nature of participant’s motivation, , though the citizens, as one of the members of the 
public, concern about their own interests, they may willing to enjoy the public engineering projects’ benefits rather than bear 
the costs of various decision-making. And the second factor is the loose nature of participating organizations. The public 
participation is individual, spontaneous, casual, loose and so on, which lacks the effective safeguard from some organizations
and systems, and does not have the ability to bargain with the government. The passive nature of participation manner is the 
third factor. In the absence of adequate internal motivation and planning information, the public and the government are not 
interactively interrelated. The public have often been misled due to the limitations of themselves and their education levels, as 
well as the information asymmetry. So in most cases the public are just "inquirers" or “decorators" whose opinions have no 
restraining force. And the fourth factor is the intermittent nature of participation process. The public’s participation is lagged
behind which means that they express their views possibility only in "how" rather than "what". There is no opportunity for 
them to participate in public engineering projects’ whole decision-making process. And the fifth is the low level of 
participation. Most of the public still stay at the initial stage of announcements and investigation through the process of major 
public engineering projects’ decision-making.
THE ANALYSIS ON NESTED-GAME MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING ON LARGE PUBLIC ENGINEERING 
PROJECTS
The major public engineering projects’ decision-making are reflected the pattern of government monoad domination 
because the superincumbent constraints relationship of each game main body. Fig. 1 uses nested-game model to explain the 
process.
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Fig.1 The nested-game model of the decision-making on
In Fig. 1, the participators’ utility of major public engineering projects can be expressed the income in game strategy. 
The central government, local government and the public utility denoted as UCǃULǃUP
The utility function of central government, local government and the public denoted as U
respectively. the supply and actual 
demand expressed a distinct imbalance in the public engineering projects due to China has carry out the top-down and 
government monoad domination mechanism in decision-making and supply for a long time. The public are usually the 
passive recipients of public engineering projects, so their strategy has little effect on equilibrium outcome of the game. In 
such a situation, this paper will focus on the local government’s strategic choices and analysis the utility function of local 
government in order to achieve a balanced path.
C=UC(aciˈaliˈapi)ˈ
UL=UL(aciˈaliˈapiˈElc)ˈUP=UP(aciˈaliˈapiˈEpl)respectively. In which aciǃaliǃapi denote the central government, 
local government and public’s decision-making vector(i=1ˈ2ˈ…ˈn) respectively. Elc indicates the local government’s 
decision-making nested in the central government’s decision-making, or a recognized level of local government’s decision-
making by the central government, that is, the consistency of local and central government; and Epl indicates the public’s 
participation nested in local government's decision-making. Local government utility function under the nested-game shows 
that utility do not only by the impact of their actions, but also from the central government’s desire. Similarly, the public
participation in decision-making of major public engineering projects also be affected by local governments game. By study 
the utility function Elc of local government as a case.
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ŃP HDQVZ KHQWhe local government’s desirer accord with the central that the game can increase the effectiveness of 
local government. ńP HDQVZ KHQWKHORFDODQGFHQWUDOJRYHUQP HQWÿVGHVLUHUKDYHODUJHUGLIIHUHQFHWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQP HQWÿV
recognition of local government will fall. Therefore, based on a rational assumption, the local government exist incentives to 
cater for central government in major public engineering projects decision-making game. In particular, the local government 
cater to the central government can obtain other benefits outside the public engineering projects game, such as the promotion 
of local government officials, this kind of  revenue will far exceed the benefits that do not cater to the central government’s 
strategy.
China's major public engineering projects decision-making nested-game is a sequential game, in which the central 
government first show willingness to invest public construction project, local governments will follow to make a choice, and 
finally is the public’s participation. Thinking in accordance with backward induction, the game's equilibrium path as follows: 
㽲㩷㫋㪿㪼㩷㪺㫆㫊㫋㩷㫆㪽㩷㫇㫌㪹㫃㫀㪺㩷㫇㪸㫉㫋㫀㪺㫀㫇㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㫀㫅㩷㫇㫉㫆㫁㪼㪺㫋㩷㪻㪼㪺㫀㫊㫀㫆㫅-making is high, and the individuals of the public do not have the ability 
to bargain with the government, therefore, rational public will select "accept" strategy, all of the  "not acceptable" in basic
sub-game have been removed. 㽳㩷㪹㪸㫊㪼㪻㩷㫆㫅㩷㫇㫌㪹㫃㫀㪺㩷㪿㪸㫊㩷㫄㪸㪻㪼㩷 㫀㫋㩷㪺㫃㪼㪸㫉㫃㫐㩷㫋㪿㪸㫋㩷㫊㪼㫃㪼㪺㫋㩷㩹㪸㪺㪺㪼㫇㫋㩹㩷㫊㫋㫉㪸㫋㪼㪾㫐㩷㪸㫅㪻㩷㩹㪺㪸㫋㪼㫉㩷㫋㫆㩹㩷㪺㪼㫅㫋㫉㪸㫃㩷
government will increase its effectiveness, the local governments will choose "cater to", all sub-game with "do not cater to" 
strategy have been removed. After two eliminate only two equilibrium outcome, namely, (offer, cater to, receive), and (not 
offer, cater to, receive), the corresponding utility is (UC1ˈUL1ˈUP1)and(UC5ˈUL5ˈUP5)respectively. 㽴㩷㪮㪿㪼㫅㩷㫋㪿㪼㩷㪺㪼㫅㫋㫉㪸㫃㩷
government realized that the local government will choose "cater to" strategy, and the public will choose the "accept" strategy 
too, the central government only according to their own utility function to determine the choice "offer" or "not offer". If UC1> 
UC5, the central government will select "offer", then (UC1ˈUL1ˈUP1) is a perfect Nash equilibrium at this time; if UC1<UC5,
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the central government will choose "not offer", (UC5ˈUL5ˈUP5) for the perfect Nash equilibrium; if UC1˙UC5
From above it can be seen that China’s major public engineering projects’ decision-making had long been under 
government monoad domination mechanism, from the central government to local governments, the government will have a 
clearly unanimity from top to bottom, but the public as the basic level and have the strongest demand, lack of the decision-
making powers and abilities for public engineering projects. Government monoad domination mechanism neglect of the 
differences between public preferences and the affluence demands in market conditions, the government’s excessive 
concentration of decision-making power also contrary to the government's objective, such as democratization, transparency 
and efficiency, resulting decision-making mistakes in major public engineering projects frequently at last.
, the central 
government will choose one of a strategy according to their own arrangements, and this was a mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium.
CONSTRUCT MULTI-INTERESTS BALANCED MECHANISM UNDER THE NEW NESTED RELATIONSHIP 
OF DECISION-MAKING ON LARGE PUBLIC ENGINEERING PROJECTS
According to the contradictions which caused by government monoad domination decision-making mechanism, many 
scholars put forward the multi-dominant theory corresponding to monoad domination theory: "multiple" means that a number 
of decision-making interact independently, there is no one has "ultimate authority" in the exercise of monopoly power , 
decision-making power in a highly decentralized state. Multi-dominant theory is based on the following assumptions:
ŁWKHSXEOLFRIHDFKXUEDQFRP P XQLW\KDYHGLIIHUHQWSUHIHUHQFHVIRUWKHSXEOLFSURMHFWVVXSSO\Z LWKWKHVDP H
preferences people tend to live together;
łWKHSXEOLFLQGLIIHUHQWFLWLHVFRP P XQLWLHVFDQFRP SDUHDQGHYDOXDWHWKHGLIIHUHQWXQLWVLQWKHLUSHUformance on the 
provision of public services, the public can choose their own recognized services, express their preferences and concerns 
effectively.
ŃWKHORFDOJRYHUQP HQWVLQDFRP SHWLWLYHP DUNHWHQYLURQP HQWZ LOOKDYHJUHDWHUP RWLYDWLRQWRDFWLYHO\SURYide the 
public with high-quality public engineering projects services, and carry out effective team production and collaborative 
production, in order to form the public good reputation and improve their own performance.
ńLQSXEOLFengineering projects participation decision-making, the public actively participate in it, and to express their 
real needs and preferences in a legal effective way.
The significance of multi-dominant theory is advocate the public form a new collective consumption units based on the 
community level, thereby encouraging the public to discuss face to face, so that the public have the opportunity to at least 
reach a consensus at the community level, and thus began his public engineering projects’ participation decision-making 
action. The public will no longer as before, waiting passively for the decision-making of local government, but participate in 
public engineering projects decision-making process independently and actively. This is the community self-governance 
vision, it provides an instructive institution framework: a moderate scale community-based public to replace a single large-
scale municipal government administrative departments, and become the original need reflector and the final decision makers 
of public engineering projects. In this new management framework of overlapping management and mutual cooperation, 
achieve the demand reflected, planning, decision-making supplies from the past single top-down delivery into a combination 
of bottom-up and top-down supply modes.
According to the multi-dominant theory and the community self-governance theory, Chinese major public engineering 
projects’ decision-making game main bodies include communities, local governments and the central government. In the 
changed game structure, community representatives will be elected from the public within the community scale and accept 
the direct supervision of the public. Therefore, the community representatives from the major public engineering projects’
decision-making e game is nested in a wider range of local and central government game, and in turn, be bound for the 
desires of the community public. At the same time, local governments’ performance have also been restrict by each 
community public’s satisfaction. Utility function of local government will be changed from the old nested UL=UL(aciˈaliˈ
apiˈElc) into a new nest UL=UL(aciˈaliˈapiˈElp 0Ul
Elp
w
!
w
), and , it means the local government's strategy consistent 
with the desires of the public can increase utility. Similarly, the central government's utility function UC=UC(aciˈaliˈapiˈ
Ecp 0
Uc
Ecp
w
!
w
), and , it means the central government on major public engineering projects’ decision-making game nested in 
great game of various communities public. Game result, local governments and the central government will carry through the 
major public engineering projects’ supply decision-making from the communities public’ real need and preference.
In a community-based multi-dominant system, the public express their demands clearly for public engineering projects,
and the bottom-up decision-making mechanism can fully reflect the needs of the community public, which will form new 
multi-dominant game structure of major public engineering projects conducively. On the other hand, it can inspire the 
enthusiasm of communities to participate in decision-making. So they will work with local governments, the central 
government to establish a division and coordination multi-dominant mechanism to improve the quality and efficiency of 
decision-making, and reduce project decision-making mistakes.
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